This paper examines whether nancial conditions of the non-nancial corporate sector can explain why the recovery from recessions in the United States is slower since the mid-1980s. Leverage by the corporate sector has increased signicantly since the nancial deregulation of the mid-1980s. Empirical evidence shows that slow recoveries are associated with a signicant drop in the growth rates of investment and bank loans, and with a surge in the growth rates of corporate bonds. In an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a nancial accelerator, counterfactual experiments based on estimates of two samples 1965-1983 and 1984-2007 show that the non-nancial corporate indebtedness aects only marginally the speed of the recovery in the two samples.
Introduction
In recent times there has been an increasing interest on the role of leverage and indebtedness in shaping the business cycle. Leverage that builds up in`normal times' can generate adverse feedback loops in`bad times', eventually leading to a prolonged credit crunch (Brunnermeier et al., 2012) . Changes in balance sheets of borrowers and lenders can substantially aect the response of macroeconomic variables to adverse shocks hitting the economy. Ng and Wright (2013) argue that the process of deleveraging can aect the recovery. In fact, in a highly leveraged economy the whole private sector nancial institutions, rms and households attempt to deleverage when asset prices start to fall.
Since all agents increase saving at the same time the economy looses demand, thereby frustrating any attempt to repair balance sheets. In a sample of 14 advanced countries between 1870 and 2008, Jordà et al. (2013) nd evidence of a close relationship between credit-intensive expansions and the intensity and the persistence of the subsequent recession.
Recovery rates from recessions computed as four and eight-quarter growth after trough have become signicantly slower since the mid-1980s in the US economy, as shown by Galí et al. (2012) in the context of the debate jobless versus slow recoveries. At the same time, nancial deregulation has led to an increase in leverage in many sectors of the US economy. This paper investigates whether the build-up of leverage in the non-nancial corporate sector could help explain the slow recoveries. The key intuition is that, because of the deleveraging process in response to shocks, borrowers may postpone investment because they have to build up their capital. The paper rst documents three sets of stylised facts in the US economy. First, following Galí et al. (2012) it shows that in the post-WWII period the speed of recovery of economic activity following recessions has signicantly slowed down since the mid-1980s. Dierently from Galí et al. (2012) , the paper examines the growth rates of the GDP main components and it shows that these slower recoveries are associated with a large and signicant drop in the growth rate of (in particular non-residential) investment following a recession. The cumulated growth rate of non-residential investment two years after the trough of the recession falls from more than 16% in the earlier period to less than 2% after the mid-1980s. This drop in the growth rate of investment is also reected in a signicant drop of borrowing by the non-nancial corporate sector. While before the mid-1980s, real debt of the corporate sector typically grew by more than 10 percent in the two years after the trough of a recession, afterwards real debt remained below its level at the trough of the recession for two years following the trough. Second, in the the non-nancial corporate sector the growth rates of loans are signicantly slower since the mid-1980s, while the contrary happens for the growth rates of corporate bonds. Third, following the nancial deregulation of the mid-1980s leverage of the corporate sector, dened as the ratio of total assets over net worth, has increased quite strongly.
Average leverage rose from 1.6 in the period from 1965Q1 to 1983Q4 to a level of more than 1.9 in the period from 1984Q1 to 2007Q4. In other words, the debt to equity ratio of the corporate sector rose by 50 percent. Data also show that while there was a signicant increase in business default rates, the external nance premium has not risen that much during the Great Moderation.
The paper then uses an estimated New Keynesian (NK) model with a nancial accelerator à la Bernanke et al. (1999) to examine whether the slow recoveries from the 1990s could be explained by the dierent nancial conditions of the corporate sector. The mechanism in the model works as follows: changes in borrowers' balance sheets aect investment decisions, and hence output. In the phase of a recession, the private sector is reducing debt, asset prices fall while liabilities remain. The business sector is forced to repair balance sheets by increasing savings or paying down debt. This act of deleveraging reduces aggregate demand and lead the economy into a recession. To investigate the extent to which changes in borrowers balance sheet aect the recovery, in a rst step, we estimate the NK model over two samples, 1965Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2007Q4 , setting corporate leverage, spreads and business failure rates to those values observed in the data.
1 In a second step, similarly to Galí et al. (2012) , we conduct counterfactual experiments in order to examine whether nancial factors might explain the dierence in the speed of recoveries. Galí et al. (2012) , instead, examine rst the role of shocks while keeping parameters unchanged and then the role of all the structural parameters in explaining the slower recoveries in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model à la Smets and Wouters (2007) also featuring unemployment. In a third step we analyse the sensitivity of the impulse response functions (IRFs) to dierent nancial conditions of the nonnancial corporate sector. Our main nding is that nancial factors account only very partially for the evidence of slow recoveries from the mid-1980s.
The closest study to ours is Fuentes-Albero (2014) , who investigates whether a similar DSGE model estimated for the US economy with structural breaks in a subset of the parameter space is able to the capture the large volatility in nancial aggregates contemporary with the low volatility in real and nominal variables during the Great Moderation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the stylised facts regarding changes in the speed of recoveries and nancial conditions of the corporate business sector since the mid-1980s. Section 3 briey sketches the NK model. Section 4 presents the counterfactual exercises and impulse response function analysis. Finally, Section 5 briey concludes. The appendix complements the paper by providing (a) basic evidence on the indebtedness of the household sector and of all commercial banks in the US economy; (b) the derivation of the nancial contract, the deterministic steady state and the full set of the DSGE model linearised equilibrium conditions; (c) steady state eects of changing the deep nancial parameters of the model; (d) details on the construction of the dataset used in the estimation; and (e) a series of robustness checks for the results.
A preliminary look at the data
This section analyses the speed of recovery following a recession of some macroeconomic variables as well as developments in the non-nancial corporate sector in the US economy in the post-WWII era.
Similarly to Galí et al. (2012) , Figure 1 shows growth rates accumulated over four and eight quarters following each postwar U.S. recession of real output, real personal consumption expenditures, and real xed private investment.
2 The gure conrms that the speed of recovery of GDP has slowed down from the 1990s. A similar slowdown can be seen in the cumulated growth rates of investment and consumption, although growth rates of investment show a more pronounced pattern, mainly due to its higher volatility compared to consumption. Table 1 reports the average growth rates after NBER recessions of GDP and its main components in the pre-90 sample, which considers 8 recessions, and in the 3 recessions of the post-90 sample. It is evident that the average speed of recoveries of these variables is statistically dierent across the two samples. higher than those of non-residential investment, both series show lower growth rates after trough from the 1990s. This is also reected in the tests of statistical dierence. While for non-residential investment we always reject the null hypothesis of equal mean of the growth rates pre and post 1990 at a signicance level below one percent, for the series of residential investment we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal mean of the 8-quarter growth rate after trough across the two subsamples. As evident from the chart, the 8-quarter growth after trough of residential investment has considerably decreased in the recent nancial crisis, but not in the previous two recessions. Now we rst discuss developments of leverage and indebtedness of the non-nancial business sector. Then we compute growth rates after trough of various measures of indebtedness. We nally present some evidence on default rates and spreads. Financial data on the US non-nancial corporate sector have extensively been discussed in the literature (Geanakoplos, 2010; Covas and Den Haan, 2011; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012 , among many others). The left chart of Figure 3 shows an increasing trend of leverage, dened as the ratio between total assets and net worth, over the period 1951Q42011Q4. The right chart of Figure 3 shows another measure of leverage, dened as the ratio between tangible assets and net worth (dened as tangible assets minus credit market liabilities). This latter measure is consistent with the DSGE model presented in the following sections. Both charts show an increasing trend of leverage during the Great Moderation and a remarkable deleveraging after the dot-com bubble followed by a rapid surge before the nancial crisis particularly evident for the second denition of leverage. Table 2 reports some indicators of indebtedness of the non-nancial corporate business sector for the whole sample, for the sample 1965Q1-2007Q4, and the two subsamples, 1965Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2007Q4 . The leverage of the corporate business sector ranges from 1.59 over 1965Q1-1983Q4 to 1.93 during the Great Moderation. A similar picture also holds for the other measure of leverage, which is equal to 1.40 in the 1965Q1-1983Q4 sample and it rises to 1.77 during the Great Moderation.
Figure 4 presents growth rates accumulated over 4-quarter and 8-quarter following each postwar U.S. recession of real credit market instruments of the non-nancial corporate business sector. With the exception of the 1975 crisis, the corporate sector tends to postpone its borrowing in the last three recessions. This is also conrmed in Table 1 , which reports a signicant change in the speed of recovery of real credit market instruments. The table also shows that the change in the growth rates pre-and post-1990 of total liabilities is statistically signicant at 5%.
In the US nancial system bond markets represent the predominant way of supplying funds (Allen et al., 2004) . Corporate bonds account for almost 50% of total credit instruments of the non-nancial corporate business sector in the post-WWII era, while depository institution loans account for less than 25% as shown in Table 2 . Figure 5 shows the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates after trough of real corporate bonds. Dierently from the previous ndings, in this case it is not possible to detect a dierence in the growth rates in the latest three recessions. As evident from 3 Figure 6 shows growth rates accumulated over 4-quarter and 8-quarter following each postwar U.S. recession of real depository institution loans. It is evident that the lower growth rates of credit market instruments in the latest three recessions are driven by the developments of depository institution loans. The dierence in both the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates of bank loans is statistically signicant as shown in Table 1 . Growth rates of loans can be explained by the change in bank lending standards. Figure 7 shows the net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards for commercial and industrial loans to large and middle-market rms from 1967Q1 to 2014Q1 (Lown and Morgan, 2006) . The negative growth rates of depository institutions loans, shown in Figure 6 , occur indeed in correspondence with tighter standards in 1974Q1, 1991Q1, 2001Q4 and 2009Q2. We nally report some data on the non-nancial business sector which are used in the next sections: default rates and corporate spreads. Annual data on default rates are shown in Figure 8 .
Data show a clear counter-cyclical pattern; this is particularly evident in the last three recessions.
Average default rates at the time of the recessions in the Great Moderation are much higher than the 3 In this case we perform a left-tailed t-test, i.e. the mean of the rst period is less than that of the second period. It is worth noting that small and large rms obtain funds from dierent sources: the former rely primarily on bank credit to nance their investments, while the latter obtain a considerable portion of funding in direct markets (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993 Smets and Wouters (2007) , which also features a nancial accelerator mechanism à la Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). The BGG model has been chosen for a variety of reasons. First, the seminal contribution by BGG is an important reference point in the mainstream DSGE literature on nancial frictions. Second, this model might address issues related to the nancial conditions of the non-nancial business sector. Third it captures some of the mechanisms through which credit market conditions can impact macroeconomic dynamics (see also Christiano et al., 2014) : the rms balance sheet channel is present, while the household balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel are absent. The former channel stresses the importance of balance sheet conditions of debtors: when borrowers have little wealth to contribute to the project nancing, the potential divergence of interests between borrowers and lenders (the suppliers of external funds) is greater and, therefore, agency costs increase.
In equilibrium lenders must be compensated for higher agency costs by a larger external nance premium, i.e. the dierence between the cost of raising funds externally and the opportunity cost of using internal nance. Therefore, the external nance premium depends inversely on borrowers' net worth. Fluctuations in borrowers' balance sheets due to changes in asset prices and cash ow then aect investment decisions and, hence, output.
5
The economy is populated by: households; labor unions; labor packers; retailers; nal good rms; capital producers; entrepreneurs; and the policymaker. Households consume, save, and supply labor. A labor union dierentiates labor and sets wages in a monopolistically competitive market.
Competitive labor packers buy labor service from the union, package and sell it to entrepreneurs.
In the goods market retailers buy goods from intermediate goods rms, dierentiate them and sell them in a monopolistically competitive market. The aggregate nal good is produced by perfectly competitive rms assembling a continuum of intermediate goods. Capital producers purchase investment and depreciated capital to transform them into capital sold to entrepreneurs and used for production. Entrepreneurs maximize the ow of discounted prots by choosing the quantity of factors for production and stipulate a nancial contract to obtain funds from lenders. For the nancing decision there is a costly state verication problem (Townsend, 1979) and lenders might have to pay a xed auditing cost to observe an individual borrower's return. The policymaker sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule. Since the structure of model closely follows Smets and Wouters (2007) and BGG, here we discuss those features needed to understand the following sections. The system of all the linearized equilibrium conditions is shown in Appendix B.2.
5 Alternatively, we could have investigated the bank lending channel, which focuses on the supply of intermediate credit, in a model à la Gertler and Karadi (2011) . However, in such a model an economy with more leveraged banks can lend more compared to an economy with less leveraged banks. The model by Gertler and Karadi in fact requires that the incentive compatibility constraint (between households and banks) is always satised; and, at any reasonable calibrated level of indebtedness, banks can still aord to lend. Hence, such a model is not a good candidate to answer the research question of the paper.
The representative household maximizes the utility function, which specializes as
where h measures the degree of supercial external habits in consumption, σ c is the parameter of relative risk aversion, L h t is labour supply in terms of hours worked and σ measures the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage. The representative household enters period t with nominal deposits in the banks, that pay the gross nominal interest rate, R n t , between t and t + 1. During period t, each household chooses to consume C t ; supplies L h t hours of work; and allocates savings in deposits, D t . Each household gains an hourly real wage, and dividend payments from rms. The government grants transfers and imposes real lump-sum taxes.
Households supply homogeneous labour to monopolistic labour unions which dierentiate it.
Labour service used by entrepreneurs is a composite of dierentiated types of labour. As in Kimball (1985) the price elasticity of demand is a function of relative prices. Labour unions adjust wages infrequently following the Calvo scheme. Let σ w be the probability of keeping wages constant; hence, each period there is a constant probability (1 − σ w ) that the union is able to adjust the wage, independently of past history. For the other fraction that cannot adjust, the wage is automatically increased at the aggregate ination rate, where σ wi denotes the degree of wage indexation. The goods market has a similar structure: retailers purchase intermediate goods at a price equal to the marginal cost and dierentiate them in a monopolistically competitive market. Each retailer resets its price with probability (1 − σ p ) and σ pi denotes the degree of price indexation.
Capital producers purchase at time t investment and depreciated capital to transform them into capital sold to rms and used for production at time t + 1. The law of motion of capital is then equal to
where δ stands for depreciation. The adjustment cost function satises the following properties:
(1) = (1) = 0, and (1) = ξ > 0. The shock to the marginal eciency of investment, x t , follows an AR(1) process, ρ x is an autoregressive coecient and ε x t is a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σ x . Prots are given by the dierence between the revenue from selling capital at the relative price Q t and the costs of buying capital from intermediate goods rms and the investment needed to build new capital. The optimality condition is a Tobin's Q equation, which relates the price of capital to the marginal adjustment costs.
Entrepreneurs produce goods in a perfectly competitive market. They maximize the ow of discounted prots by choosing the quantity of factors for production. The production function specializes as
t is entrepreneurial labor which, for simplicity, is equal to 1. A t is the transitory productivity (TFP) shock following an AR (1) process, ρ a is an autoregressive coecient and ε a t is a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σ a . The real gross aggregate ex-post return on capital expenditures, R k t+1 , is equal to
where Z k t is the real rental price of capital, given by
At the end of period t, entrepreneurs buy from capital producers capital, K t+1 , that will be used at time t + 1 at the real price Q t . Capital purchases are nanced by internal and external nancing.
The former is given by net worth, N t+1 net worth at the end of time t and the latter by borrowing from banks, B t+1 . In equilibrium total loans supplied to the entrepreneurs are equal to households deposits, i.e. B t = D t . The amount of borrowing is dened as
The return to capital is sensitive to an idiosyncratic shock. The ex post gross return on capital for entrepreneur j is ω j t R k t+1 , where ω j t is an idiosyncratic disturbance to entrepreneur j return. 6 The disturbance is an i.i.d. log-normal variable with standard deviation σ, ln(ω) ∼ N (−0.5σ 2 , σ 2 ). Then E[ω] = 1 and
where Φ N (·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal and z ≡ (ln(ω) + 0.5σ 2 )/σ.
After the investment decision is made, the lender can observe ω only by paying the monitoring cost, which is a proportion µ of the realized gross payo to the rm's capital, i.e. µω t+1 R k t+1 Q t K t+1 .
The optimal nancial contract species a cuto value for the idiosyncratic shock,ω, such that if ω ≥ω the entrepreneur is able to repay the loan at the contractual rate R l t . Alternatively, if ω ≤ω the borrower gets nothing, the lender pays the auditing costs and his net receipts are
The threshold value,ω, is dened as follows
Hence, if ω ≥ω, the entrepreneur repays the lender the amount R l t B t+1 and keeps the dierence equal to ω t+1 R k t+1 Q t K t+1 − R l t B t+1 . The entrepreneur oers a state-contingent contract that guarantees the lender an expected return equal to the riskless rate. The expected gross share of prots going 6 For the sake of simplicity we drop the j index. For aggregation see BGG.
to the lender is dened as follows
and Γ (ω) = 1 − F (ω), where F (ω) is the business failure rate. 7
The nancial contract is chosen to maximise entrepreneurial utility subject to the participation constraint for the lender:
where the net share of prots going to the lender is Γ(ω t ) − µG(ω t ), the gross share is Γ(ω t ) and Γ (ω) = −f (ω). The monitoring costs are dened as µG(ω t ) = µ´ω
The constraint, equation (10), assures that the return to lend to entrepreneurs, left hand side, should be equal to the opportunity costs of lending, right hand side, where R t−1 is the gross real interest rate implied by the loan contract signed at time t − 1. Appendix F investigates the robustness of the results in the case of nominal debt-contracts.
(the leverage ratio), and λ the Lagrange multiplier. The rst order conditions are:ω
As shown in Appendix B.1, the spread can be expressed as a function of the leverage ratio. In particular, the spread between the external nancing cost and the real interest rate can be written
where EP , the external nance premium, has the following properties: EP (·) < 0, EP (1) = 1;
and b t is a risk premium shock as in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013). As the borrower's equity stake in a project N t+1 /Q t K t+1 falls, i.e. the leverage ratio rises, the loan becomes riskier and the cost of borrowing rises.
In order to ensure that entrepreneurial net worth will never be enough to fully nance capital acquisitions, it is assumed that each entrepreneur survives until the next period with probability θ and her expected lifetime is consequently equal to 1/(1 − θ). Net worth is given by the sum of the entrepreneurial equity, V t , and what is earned by entrepreneurial labour in the production of goods,
7 The time index is dropped for briefness.
where ε n t is a wealth shock similarly to Fuentes-Albero (2014) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016) .
Entrepreneurial equity is given by the dierence between earning on assets and borrowing repayments, including the monitoring costs
The entrepreneurs that die consume the residual net worth. Entrepreneurial consumption is then equal to
The policymaker sets the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor rule
where Y * t is the level of output that would prevail under exible prices and wages without the two mark-up shocks, and ε i t is the monetary policy shock. The resource constraint completes the model:
There are eight orthogonal structural shocks: the risk premium, the investment-specic technology, the wealth, the monetary policy, the government, the TFP, the price mark-up, and the wage mark-up shocks. The following linearized equilibrium conditions related to the nancial accelerator mechanism can explain how the rms balance sheet channel is operational in the model:
Equation (20) states that the external nancing cost must equate the external nance premium, gross of the real interest rate,R t =R n t −Π t+1 . The external nance premium depends positively on the leverage,Q t +k t+1 −n t+1 . The parameter κ ≡ − The evolution of net worth, equation (21), mainly depends on entrepreneurial equity of surviving
The role of wage income is indeed very small, given that under most calibrations, the fraction of entrepreneurial labour is 0.01. The ratio of wage income to net worth, W e /N , is about 0.001, while the ratio of entrepreneurial equity to net worth, V /N , is greater than one. 9 The survival rate, θ,
8 Lower case variables represent detrended variables, variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values, and the hat denotes variables log-linearized around their steady state balanced growth path. 9 In fact some papers (e.g. Christensen and Dib, 2008) ignore entrepreneurial labour since it exerts a negligible impact on the dynamics of the model. clearly aects the persistence of net worth.
The evolution of entrepreneurial equity, equation (22), is aected by steady state values of the following nancial parameters: total monitoring costs, µG(ω), and its derivative; the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock,ω; the leverage ratio, K/N ; the gross real return on capital expenditures, R k ; and the gross real nominal rate, R,
Equity clearly depends negatively on monitoring costs and on the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock. An increase in the steady state leverage ratio, on one hand, raises the amount of assets and, hence, their return. On the other hand, it also implies higher borrowing repayments.
Higher steady state return on capital expenditures unambiguously raises entrepreneurial equity, while a change in the steady state real interest rate aects the borrowing decisions agreed in the loan contract.
The threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock is governed by the following equation:
The rationale of the rst order condition of the nancial contract is that the higher the threshold value,ω, the higher the spread, s.
By denition, borrowing, equation (24), depends positively on total assets and negatively on net worth,b
The lower the steady state leverage ratio the higher is the impact of the value of assets and net worth on the dynamics of debt.
Nonlinearities might arise from the nancial accelerator mechanism, which should be stronger the deeper the economy is in recession and the weaker the balance sheet of borrowers (Bernanke et al., 1996; Mertens and Ravn, 2011) . In fact, the ight to quality implies that changes in net worth induce a greater variation in the agency costs of lending for low-net-worth borrowers compared to high-net-worth borrowers. Appendix C investigates these nonlinearities by examining how the deep nancial parameters aect steady state leverage, spread and elasticity of the external nance premium with respect to the leverage position of entrepreneurs.
Results on the role of nancial factors
This section analyses the eects of nancial factors in accounting for slow recoveries since the mid- 1965Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2007Q4. 10 Section 4.3 discusses transmission mechanisms via the IRFs analysis.
Estimation strategy
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods over two samples, 1965Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2007Q4 , using a set of macroeconomic and nancial variables. In particular, we use the following observable eight variables: GDP, consumption, investment, wage, hours worked, GDP deator ination, the federal funds rate and the spread. Appendix D presents a detailed discussion of data sources, denitions and transformations. The number of variables in the data coincides with the number of shocks in the model. Table 4 shows the calibration of the parameters common to the two samples that cannot be identied in the dataset and/or are related to steady state values of the variables. The time period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data. The depreciation rate, δ, is equal to 0.025, corresponding to an annual depreciation rate of 10%. The capital share, α, is one third.
The discount factor, β, and the coecient of relative risk aversion, σ c , are set equal to 0.9985 and 1.28 respectively, implying an annualised interest rate of 6.7%. Similarly to BGG the fraction of household labour, Ω, is calibrated at 0.99 so that the share of income going to entrepreneurial labour is small. The ratio of government spending to GDP is equal to 0.18. The Kimball aggregators in the goods and labour market are calibrated at 33, with the price and wage mark-up at 1.1 (e.g. Coenen et al., 2007) .
In steady state the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock,ω, which determines the leverage, the spread and the business failure rate, is a function of the following underlying parameters: δ, α, β, σ c , Ω, γ, Π, µ, σ and θ (equation (38) in Appendix B.1). The quarterly growth rate of real GDP, consumption, investment and wage, γ and the steady state ination rate are set consistently with the series in the dataset over the two samples 1965Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2007Q4, as shown in Table 5 . The deep nancial parameters of the model are: (i) µ, the proportion of monitoring 10 The dataset ends in 2007Q4 to avoid potential distortionary eects on the estimates of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate as in Galí et al. (2011) . For the sake of robustness, Appendix E.1 shows the sensitivity of the results when the dataset include the Great Recession. Table 5 : Calibration of sample-specic parameters costs; (ii) σ, the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock; and (iii) θ, the survival rate of entrepreneurs. corresponding value of the elasticity of the external nance premium with respect to the leverage 11 They nd that risk shocks play an important role in driving business cycle uctuations. The eects of these shocks are similar to those of the risk premium shock in equation (20), since they both inuence the demand for capital (by aecting the amount of credit extended to entrepreneurs). 12 The deep nancial parameters are calibrated because they are not well identied in the data. Several contributions compare the model by Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW) with a SW model augmented with the nancial accelerator à la Bernanke et al. (1999) (see De Graeve, 2008; von Heideken, 2009; Villa, 2016, among many others) . In all these contributions the comparison of marginal data densities reveals that nancial frictions are empirically relevant since they improve the t of the model. We rely on this literature because it shows that the nancial accelerator model is not only accepted by the data but it also provides a gain in tting macroeconomic variables compared to a standard SW economy. Table 6 : Prior and posterior distributions in the two samples position is equal to 0.037. As explained in Appendix C, lower monitoring costs imply that business investment becomes less sensitive to nancial frictions. Table 6 shows the posterior distributions of the remaining parameters estimated over two sample periods. For each parameter the table reports the posterior mean with 95% probability intervals in parentheses. During the Great Moderation the volatility of most shocks has decreased as evident
from Figure 10 , that shows the smoothed shocks which are the main drivers of output and investment.
Some dierences emerge for the structural parameters. The habit persistence parameter decreases in the second sample, while the autoregressive coecient of the risk premium shock rises. The degree of price stickiness is higher in the second sample, wage indexation to past ination has fallen in the second sample. Finally the second sample features a higher elasticity of capital utilization. As noted by Galí et al. (2012) , it is dicult to assess whether these changes are due to weak identication or to an eective change in the economic structure.
Counterfactual experiments
The counterfactual experiment allows to analyse the role of the parameters in accounting for slower recoveries since mid 1980s. As a rst step, for the baseline estimated models we compute the speed of recovery of the simulated series of GDP, investment, consumption and borrowing for the two samples. Sample 1 considers the four recessions from 1965Q1 to 1983Q4 (i.e. 1970Q3, 1975Q1, 1980Q2 and 1982Q3) , while sample 2 takes into account the two recessions in 1991Q1 and in 2001Q4.
The dierence between growth rates after NBER recessions of Table 1 and of Table 7 is due to the fact that: (i) the former are coming from the data, the latter from the estimated model; (ii) the observable variables used in the model are logged and expressed in per capita terms dierently from the data; and (iii) the episodes of recessions are dierent. As shown in Table 7 , in sample 1 the speed of recovery of the logged per capita series of GDP is 3.80, that of investment is 6.93, and that of consumption is 2.93. And they are higher than those in sample 2. The model is also able to replicate the slower recovery of non-nancial corporate sector borrowing in the Great Moderation, although borrowing is not included as observable variable in the dataset. In fact, the 4-quarter growth rate of borrowing is 1.07 in the rst sample and it decreases to -5.34 in the second sample.
Following Galí et al. (2012) , the counterfactual experiment for sample 1 consists in simulating the model economy imposing the deep nancial parameters (and all the estimated structural parameters) of sample 2, while keeping all the smoothed shocks estimated in the previous sample. In such a way it is possible to simulate the outcomes of sample 1-shocks with sample 2-parameters. We then compute the speed of recovery of GDP, investment, consumption and borrowing, i.e. the average 4-quarter growth rate after recession. Similar procedure is used to run counterfactual experiments for sample 2. Table 7 : Average 4-quarter growth rates after trough higher steady state leverage ratio causes a smaller impact of the value of assets and net worth on the dynamics of borrowing. Capital and net worth are state variables, which slowly revert back to steady state. Therefore, when leverage is high, those state variables aect to a minor extent movements in borrowing, the growth rate of which becomes faster. Second, during the recovery phase borrowers have easier access to credit. The stronger nancial accelerator in a highly leveraged economy measured by a higher elasticity of the external nance premium also causes a faster recovery of credit. Overall, nancial factors play a role in accounting for the speed of recovery, but it turns out to be small. We then simulate the outcomes of the pre-83Q4 shocks with the post-83Q4 parameters in place both estimated structural and calibrated nancial parameters. In this counterfactual model the average growth rate of GDP becomes 2.06, the growth rate of investment 3.41, the growth rate of consumption 1.71 and that of borrowing 0.52. Although the dierence in growth rates between the estimated model and the counterfactual one is larger than that in the previous experiment, the dierence in the mean growth rates across the two specications is not statistically signicant based on a one-sided t-test. There are several reasons that could explain the limited role of nancial factors in explaining the slow recoveries in the estimated model. First, the nancial accelerator mechanism is likely to exert an eect more on the depth of the simulated recession rather than its persistence. Second, the Great Moderation is characterized by lower monitoring costs, which in turn implies a weaker nancial accelerator eect. Third, the BGG model does not distinguish among sources of external nance. So it is not possible to disentangle developments in bank loans versus corporate bonds, which show considerable heterogeneity. Finally, the value of leverage in sample 1 is 1.40, while it is 1.77 in sample 2. Appendix C shows some important non-linearities in the deep nancial parameters.
The observed dierence in the leverage might not be large enough to generate substantial dierent dynamics in the model. It should also be noted that the slow recovery could be due to labour market mismatch (ahin et al., 2014) .
Given that the role of structural parameters is limited in aecting the speed of recovery, we now turn to the analysis of the variance decomposition to assess the importance of exogenous sources of uctuations. Table 8 shows the TFP shock is the main driver of output growth in both samples.
Monetary policy shocks play a non-negligible role in aecting GDP uctuations, accounting for about 12% of its variation in both samples. As far as investment is concerned, there are some dierences between the two samples. In the rst sample the investment-specic technology shock accounts for about half of the uctuations in investment growth, and the wealth shock explains 34% of its uctuations, while in the second sample the investment-specic technology shock plays an even more important role. Overall, for both samples, the wealth and the investment-specic technology shocks account for about 90% of investment uctuations. Wealth shocks play a role also in explaining ination and the nominal interest rate, while mark-up shocks mainly aect movements in ination.
Impulse response function analysis
This section discusses the impulse responses to the TFP, wealth and investment-specic technology shocks, which are the most important drivers of the US business cycle, as shown in The rst row of Figure 11 shows the simulated recession driven by a TFP shock. This shock has a direct impact on output by making input less productive. The fall in the marginal productivity of capital leads to a fall in the return on capital expenditures, R k t . This in turn causes a decline in the value of the rm and hence in net worth, as evident from equations (21) and (22). The fall in net worth leads to a decrease in assets and hence generates a further retrenchment in capital and investment. The TFP shock causes a rise in the leverage which leads to an initial increase in the external nancing costs, leading to a fall in borrowing. There are some crucial parameters that aect the depth of the recession and that are dierent from the two samples. The degree of price stickiness is higher during the Great Moderation, with retailers reoptimising prices almost every 2 and a half years compared to 2 quarters in the rst sample. The interest rate smoothing is higher in sample 2 as well as the elasticity of capital utilisation. Since retailers change prices more often in sample 1, this causes a rise in ination which is more pronounced. In addition, it is more costly to change the utilisation rate of capital in sample 2 the elasticity is equal to 0.79, while it is equal to 0.69 in sample 1. Hence, a lower utilization rate further depresses aggregate production. In terms of growth rates after the trough, the 4-quarter growth rate is equal to 0.07 in sample 1, higher than the corresponding growth rate in sample 2, equal to 0.03. Hence the second sample features a slower recovery.
The immediate eect of a contractionary wealth shock is to decrease net worth, as evident from equation (21). The reduction in internal nancing makes entrepreneurs more depending on external nancing, hence debt increases. As a result, there is a higher probability of default and the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock rises. Lenders hence require a higher premium. This causes a reduction in investment, and output due to the higher borrowing costs. The downward shift in aggregate demand leads to a fall in ination. In both sample this shock is highly persistent, with an autoregressive coecient of 0.98 in the rst period and of 0.99 in the Great Moderation. This explains why the fall in net worth is even more long lasting in the second sample. The four-quarter growth rate after the trough of output is equal in the two samples. Hence, the response of output to a wealth shock does not feature a slower recovery during the Great Moderation.
The last row of Figure 11 shows the eects of an investment-specic technology shock. A contractionary investment-specic technology shock implies a rise in the price of capital, Q t . But a change in the price of capital has two eects: (i) investment falls; and (ii) net worth of rms increases due to the higher return on capital. The latter eect causes a fall in the spread. This causes a less pronounced decline in investment. The presence of nancial frictions, therefore, attenuates the fall in investment and output (see also Christensen and Dib, 2008) . This shock does not replicate the positive co-movement between output and investment, at least on impact, as also noted by Villa (2016) . The higher steady state leverage and the lower value of monitoring costs in sample 2, equation (22), explains the more pronounced increase in net worth, which leads to a stronger fall in the spread and a weaker fall in investment. The lower degree of price stickiness in sample 1 causes a fall in ination which is more pronounced in this sample. The nominal interest rate increases by more in the rst sample and this causes a more severe retrenchment in capital and investment. The four-quarter growth rate after the trough of output is 0.24 in the rst sample and 0.27 in the second sample. Hence, the speed of recovery is slightly higher in the rst sample. Tables 2 and 3. 14 We then show in Figure 12 impulse responses for a model with sample 1 nancial parameters versus one with sample 2 nancial parameters, while all the other parameters are the same between the two specications.
This exercise helps to isolate, from a graphical point of view, the role of nancial conditions of the corporate sector in aecting the speed of recovery. Several results emerge. First, although the dierent nancial conditions aect the responses of net worth and the spread, the overall impact on output and investment is small. As far as the TFP shock is concerned, the impulse responses of output and investment almost coincide under the two scenarios. Second, under sample 1 nancial parameters there is a greater impact of a lower steady state leverage on the dynamics of debt, as explained in Section 3. This is particularly evident for the wealth shock. Third, an economy with a higher leverage and spread features a more severe recession in response to the investment-specic technology shock, but the speed of recovery is not aected. This gure conrms that the nancial conditions of the corporate sector marginally aect the speed of recovery.
A natural question then arises: is there any parameterization of nancial conditions that has a considerable impact on the model dynamics? Figure 13 shows impulse responses under four alternative scenarios: (i) sample 1 but with a period of changing prices of 6 quarters (σ p = 0.835);
(ii) a model where the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock, σ, is equal to 0.05, while all the other parameters are those of scenario (i); (iii) a model where monitoring costs, µ, are equal to 0.001, with all the other parameters of scenario (i); and (iv) a model where the survival rate, θ, is equal to 0.925, with all the other parameters of scenario (i). Hence in each model we change one nancial parameter at a time. The latter three models imply a higher leverage equal to 5.83, 5.36, and 1.82 for σ = 0.05, µ = 0.001 and θ = 0.925 respectively. While the rst two models feature a low steady state spread, changing θ leads to an implausible high spread, greater than a thousand basis points py. We impose a higher degree of price stickiness than that of sample 1 because in the presence of stickier prices the change in ination is moderate and so is the change in the nominal interest rate. This clearly aects the dynamics of capital and investment, allowing nancial factors to play a larger role. This is a ceteris paribus exercise since σ p is the same in all the four scenarios.
Under this alternative parameterization, nancial factors do aect the dynamic properties of the model. As far as the depth of the recession is concerned, lower monitoring costs and volatility of the 14 Table 20 in Appendix shows the posterior distributions of parameters and shocks.
idiosyncratic shock make the recession less severe in the case of the wealth shock due to the limited nancial accelerator eect. In fact, with σ and µ low, the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock is around 0.90, which implies a low elasticity of the external nance premium. In the case of the investment shock, the contraction in investment is more pronounced because there is a much weaker fall in the spread. The model with a low θ, instead, features a larger response of the spread due to the higher value of the elasticity of the external nance premium. A stronger nancial accelerator eect causes a more severe contraction in output and investment in the case of the TFP and wealth shock, while a moderate fall in real variables in the case of the investment shock, which is characterized by the decline in the spread.
The role of nancial conditions as an endogenous cause of slower recovery is limited in response to the TFP shock and the wealth shock. It is worth noting that those shocks feature a high persistence, with an AR (1) coecient of 0.98, as shown in Table 6 . The lower exogenous persistence of the investment-specic technology shock whose AR (1) coecient is 0.55 makes the nancial conditions of the corporate sector relevant. In fact, the 4-quarter growth rate after trough is 0.25 in sample 1, and it decreases to 0.14 when µ is equal to 0.01 and to 0.17 for σ = 0.05. Hence the models featuring higher leverage experience a slower recovery, as observed in the data. The model is thus able to imply a relationship between the speed of recovery from recessions and the magnitude of corporate leverage in these cases.
We further investigate the role of endogenous versus exogenous factors aecting the speed of recovery. We conduct another counterfactual experiment where we impose that the TFP and the wealth shocks have the same persistence and standard deviation of the investment-specic technology shock whose persistence is lower than that of the other two shocks. We then simulate the outcomes of the pre-83Q4 shocks (where TFP and wealth shocks are modied) with the post-83Q4 nancial parameters in place. The purposes of this exercise are mainly two: rst, investigating the role of less persistent shocks and, second, disentangling the role of shocks versus nancial factors in causing the slow recoveries. The eect of less persistent TFP and wealth shocks leads to a slower recovery in an economy featuring a higher leverage. In fact, the 4-quarter growth rate of GDP becomes equal to 2.71, while it is equal to 3.80 in the baseline specication and it is equal to 3.78 in the model featuring only the nancial parameters of sample 2, as shown in Table 7 
Concluding remarks
This paper analyses whether nancial conditions of the corporate business sector can account for the slow recoveries since the mid-1980s.
Data on the US post-WWII economy show that the change in the speed of recovery of output since the mid-1980s is also mirrored by a corresponding change in the 4-and 8-quarter growth rate after trough of investment and bank borrowing by the corporate sector. However, the 4-quarter growth rate of corporate bonds is higher during the Great Moderation, revealing dierent developments of corporate indebtedness depending on the sources of external nance. The paper also documents that leverage and the business failure rate in the corporate business sector have increased since the mid-1980s, while the external nance premium has not risen that much.
In a DSGE model with a nancial accelerator à la Bernanke et al. (1999) we show that an economy featuring a lower leverage recovers faster, but the dierence in the growth rates between a model economy with lower and higher leverage is not statistically signicant. Financial conditions in the business sector aect only marginally the dierence in the growth rates of output, investment and consumption, before and after the mid-1980s. This result is conrmed by impulse response function analysis. Several reasons can explain this result. First, the nancial accelerator mechanism is likely to exert a stronger impact on the depth of the simulated recession rather than on its persistence. 6 1949q4 1954q2 1958q2 1961q1 1970q4 1975q1 1982q4 1991q1 2001q4 2009q2 Residential inv Non-residential inv 8-quarter growth after trough 1951Q4 1959Q4 1967Q4 1975Q4 1983Q4 1991Q4 1999Q4 2007Q4 Leverage (tangible assets) 25 1954q2 1958q2 1961q1 1970q4 1975q1 1980q3 1982q4 1991q1 2001q4 2009q2 8-quarter growth after trough 15 1954q2 1958q2 1961q1 1970q4 1975q1 1982q4 1991q1 2001q4 2009q2 8-quarter growth after trough 3 1954q2 1958q2 1961q1 1970q4 1975q1 1982q4 1991q1 2001q4 2009q2 8-quarter growth after trough The analysis of growth rates after trough of alternative measures of indebtedness of the nonnancial corporate sector does not assume any causal relationship with GDP. A detailed discussion on the nance-growth nexus is well beyond the scope of the paper. Notwithstanding this, crosscorrelation analysis could provide a clearer picture on the lag/lead relationships between corporate indebtedness and GDP. Table 9 shows the cross-correlation between HP component of corporate debt and HP component of GDP.
15 All the measures of corporate debt are pro-cyclical, with the exception of corporate bonds, which is almost a-cyclical. Total liabilities, credit market liabilities and depository institution loans lag the cycle by approximately one year, while corporate bonds lag the cycle by more than two years. The paper investigates the dierent mechanisms through which corporate indebtedness might aect GDP, but it is important to take into account that corporate indebtedness is endogenously determined. A DSGE model is an appropriate instrument to investigate these issues.
This appendix also presents some data on the liability side of the household sector and of all commercial banks in the US economy.
Data on household indebtedness (Table B .100, Flow of Funds) reveal that households leverage, i.e. the ratio between the value of real estate and the owners' equity in real estate, has dramatically increased only in the latest nancial crisis. As shown in Figure 14 , it is not possible to detect a statistically signicant dierence in growth rates pre-and post-1990 for indebtedness of the households sector. This result is conrmed in Table 10 , which reports also the average 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates of home mortgage liabilities. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal mean of both the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates pre-and post-1990. Table 9 : Cross-correlation with GDP t+k borrowings, trading liabilities and other liabilities; deposits account for 77% of total liabilities over the sample period. Similarly to the household sector, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal mean of both the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates pre-and post-1990. The last row of Table 10 shows the growth rates of borrowing of all commercial banks, which is the sum of borrowings from banks in the US and from others. The dierence in both the 4-quarter and 8-quarter growth rates of borrowing is not statistically signicant. As evident from Figure 15 , growth rates are dierent only in the latest crisis.
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B The Model
B.1 The nancial contract
As explained by Bernanke et al. (1999) , the optimal nancial contract species a cuto value for the idiosyncratic shock,ω, such that if ω ≥ω the entrepreneur is able to repay the loan. Alternatively, if ω ≤ω the borrower gets nothing, the lender pays the auditing costs and his net receipts are 16.72 * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of equal means at 10% signicance level of a one-sided t-test.
The 8-quarter growth rates do not take into account the recession in 1980. Table 10 : Speed of recoveries (in percent) of dierent measure of household and nancial-sector indebtedness in the two subsamples entrepreneur is able to repay the loan at the contractual rate R l t . The threshold value,ω, is dened
In this case the entrepreneur repays the lender the amount R l t B t+1 and keeps the dierence equal to
. If ω <ω, the entrepreneur declares default, the lender pays the auditing costs and his net receipts are (1 − µ)ω t+1 R k t+1 Q t K t+1 . The entrepreneur receives nothing. The loan contract must satisfy the condition that the return on the loan to the entrepreneur must be equal to the opportunity cost of lending, in terms of the risk free rate. And the entrepreneur wants to maximize its expected return dened as:
where the second term represents the cost of borrowing. The optimal contracting problem can thus be written as:
where the net share of prots going to the lender is Γ(ω) − µG(ω), the gross share is Γ(ω) =ω
The monitoring costs are dened as µG(ω) = µ´ω 0 ωf (ω)dω and G (ω) =ωf (ω).
(the leverage ratio), and λ the Lagrange multiplier. The rst order conditions 
The following equations show how to compute the elasticity of the external nance premium with respect to the leverage, κ:
Hence:
To solve forω, assume that ω is distributed log-normally: ln(ω) ∼ N (−0.5σ 2 , σ 2 ).
The optimality conditions of prot maximization yield the following demands for households and entrepreneurial labor:
where M C t+1 represents the real marginal cost, and W e t is entrepreneurial wage.
Following the procedure described by Meier and Muller (2006) , it is possible to nd the threshold valueω which solves the nancial contract. Under steady state the entrepreneurs' optimality conditions (5) and (4) can be expressed as
where M is the gross steady state mark-up, equal to the inverse of the marginal cost. Under steady state the net worth accumulation reads as follows:
where θ is the survival rate and Ω is the share of households labor. Entrepreneurial equity is
Substituting for equation (27) the ratio of entrepreneurial equity to capital can be written as
Combining previous equation yields:
Hence ω, which determines the leverage, the spread and the business failure rate, is a function of the following parameters: α, β, γ, δ, θ, µ, Π, σ c , σ 2 , Ω.
B.2 Model summary: linearised equations
Note that the deterministic growth rate driven by technological progress is represented by γ, similarly to Smets and Wouters (2007) , and Z k t = Ψ (U t ). Lower case variables represent detrended variables, variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values and the hat denotes variables loglinearized around their steady state balanced growth path.
where s =
whereŷ * t is the exible output in an economy without nominal rigidities and markup shocks.
C Steady state eects of the deep nancial parameters Figure 16 shows the sensitivity of the leverage ratio, the spread, and the elasticity of the external nance premium to the calibration of the monitoring costs, µ, the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock, σ, and the survival rate, θ, respectively by changing one parameter at a time. This exercise highlights the eects of the deep nancial parameters on the nancial variables targeted under steady state. The calibration of the other parameters which determines the value ofω is the same as in the sample 1984-2007, shown in Table 5 .
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When monitoring costs are reduced the economy tends to a model without nancial frictions:
the premium is reduced, entrepreneurs can be more leveraged under steady state, and the elasticity approaches zero i.e. a model without asymmetric information. These charts make also it clear that the nancial accelerator mechanism has nonlinear eects: for the given calibration of the other parameters, in this experiment rms are allowed to have a steady state leverage greater than 2 only for values of the monitoring costs lower than 0.04. Similar nonlinearities can be detected by looking at the eects on the steady state spread of a change in the monitoring costs.
A reduction in the volatility of the rm-specic shock yields eects analogous to the change in monitoring costs, as evident from the second row of Figure 16 . The spread and the elasticity tend do decrease, while the optimal leverage in steady state is substantially higher, similarly to the analysis of Kamber and Thoenissen (2012) .
A rise in the survival rate of rms increases net worth. This implies a reduction in the steady state leverage and lower levels of the spread. The elasticity follows a similar decreasing pattern, as shown in last chart of Figure 16 .
Hence a reduction in either µ or σ leads to a negative relationship between the spread and the leverage, while a reduction in the survival rate leads to a fall in both the leverage and the spread. Fernández and Gulan (2015) suggest that these patters can be explained in terms of demand and 17 It is worth noting that, while the steady state common growth rate γ barely aects the nancial variables, the steady state ination rate Π has a considerable eects on the steady state spread. In particular, the lower the steady state ination the higher the spread. This explains why the second sample featuring lower monitoring costs and standard deviation of idiosyncratic uncertainty, and higher survival rate is characterised by a higher steady state spread. The following set of measurement equations show the link between the observables in the dataset and the endogenous variables of the DSGE model:
where variables on the left-hand side are the observables, γ is the common quarterly trend growth rate of GDP, consumption, investment and wages;¯ is average hours worked; Π is the average quarterly ination rate; R n is the average quarterly nominal interest rate; ands is the average quarterly spread. A hat over a variable indicates the log-deviation from its own steady state.
In the robustness exercise in Appendix E.3 net worth of the corporate business sector is computed as in Table 2 , i.e. as the dierence between non-nancial assets and credit market instruments (liabilities). It is transformed in real per-capita terms and the observable variable is expressed in rst dierence.
E Sensitivity exercises for the estimation of the DSGE model
This section illustrates a series of modications in the baseline estimation of the DSGE model in order to analyse the robustness of the main results. Section E.1 shows the sensitivity of the counterfactual exercises to a longer dataset which includes the Great Recession, while Section E.2 carries out a similar analysis by looking at the eect of the other structural parameters on the slow recoveries.
Section E.3 explores the robustness of the results when net worth of the corporate business sector is added as observable in the dataset.
E.1 Including the Great Recession
The most recent nancial crisis has led to a revived interest in the role of deleveraging and nancial factors in aecting the recovery (e.g. Ng and Wright, 2013) . The counterfactual exercises presented in the paper does not include the Great Recession for potential distortionary eects on the estimates of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. In this section we conduct the counterfactual exercises for a longer second sample, 1984Q1-2013Q1. The results of this alternative exercise shown in Tables 11 are in line with those of the shorter sample. An economy featuring a higher leverage, spread and business failure rate recovers slower and viceversa but the role of nancial factors per se is limited. When we simulate the outcomes of the pre-84 shocks with the post-84 parameters in place, the dierence in growth rates after trough becomes larger, particularly for investment whose growth rate drops to 1.46. However, results should be interpreted cautiously due to the potential parameter bias due to the zero lower bound.
E.2 The role of other parameters in aecting the speed of recovery Table 12 shows the eect of the other structural parameters in isolation in accounting for the slow recoveries. When we simulate the outcomes of the sample 1 shocks with the sample 2 parameters, monetary policy and price stickiness aect the speed of recovery of both GDP and investment, while other parameters such as investment adjustment costs and capital utilisation play a smaller role.
A similar exercise conducted for sample 2 shows that other structural parameters, such as investment adjustment costs, price and wage stickiness, barely aect the speed of recovery over the 18 Table 13 shows the outcomes of the pre-83Q4 shocks with the post-83Q4 nancial parameters 18 Table 18 in Appendix G shows the posteriors of the estimated parameters. We tried to estimate the deep nancial parameters, but they were not identied monitoring costs in particular. Hence, they are calibrated. Table 13 : Average 4-quarter growth rates after trough when the nancial observable is net worth in place. Financial parameters of sample 2 aect the growth rates of output and investment, which decrease. However, the dierence in growth rates between the baseline model and the counterfactual one is not statistically signicant. When taking into account all the structural and nancial parameters, the speed of recovery of GDP and investment is slower similarly to the results shown in Table 7 . These additional counterfactual experiments conrm that the nancial conditions of the corporate business sector cannot provide an explanation on why recoveries have become slower since the 1990s.
Turning to the role of shocks, Table 14 shows variance decomposition analysis of output growth, investment growth, ination and the nominal interest rate in the estimated models. The wealth shock accounts for 14% of the variation in investment in the rst sample, and for 17% of its variation in the second sample. TFP shock is the dominant source of output growth, while investment-specic technology and the risk premium shocks are the main driver of investment. Monetary policy shocks play a non-negligible role in aecting output uctuations, while mark-up shocks are the dominant source of ination variance. The nominal interest rate is mainly driven by the two nancial shocks, the risk premium and the wealth shocks. Compared to F Allowing for nominal debt-contracts Bernanke et al. (1999) assume that debt contracts are concluded in real terms. This precludes the so-called Fisher eect: an unanticipated increase in ination lowers the real debt burden of entrepreneurs and thus increases their net worth. As shown by Christensen and Dib (2008) and Christiano et al. (2010) , the Fisher-eect generates further amplication in the case of monetary policy shocks. In the case of productivity shocks, instead, an attenuator eect is present. In fact, the countercyclical change in ination aects the real cost of repaying existing debt, which pushes down net worth in case of expansionary shocks. Lower net worth increases the external nance premium, dampening the rise in the demand for capital.
This section investigates the robustness of the results to the presence of the Fisherian debtdeation channel.
Similarly to Carrillo and Poilly (2013) , let us dene the nominal gross aggregate ex-post return on capital expenditures, R kn t , as
In case of nominal debt-contracts the optimal contracting problem can be written as:
, and λ the Lagrange multiplier. The rst order conditions are: Table 15 shows the results of the counterfactual experiments under this alternative specication of the nancial contract. In the rst sample the speed of recovery decreases when calibrating the nancial parameters to the values of those in sample 2. But the dierence is small, in particular for output whose 4-quarter growth rate after trough is 3.64 in the baseline specication and 3.57 in the counterfactual experiment. Same results apply to the second sample: an economy featuring a lower leverage and a lower spread recovers faster. However, the role of nancial parameters per se is minor. Overall, the presence of nominal debt-contracts replicates the results of the model featuring real debt-contracts, shown in Table 7 .
Results are robust also as far as variance decomposition analysis is concerned. Table 16 reports the role of shocks in aecting the business cycle. Similarly to Table 8 , the TFP shock is the main driver of output uctuations while wealth and investment-specic technology shocks account for the majority of movements in investment. Hence our results are robust when allowing for nominal debt-contracts. 
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